

Majority Unionism

Wade Rathke

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Bleak House

The dirge is real. We tramp undead and ghoulishly through the funeral procession. We shriek in grief, denial, and rage at the scarcity of mourners and the few names on the bereaved list. It is only in our last enclaves and clannish convocations that we can avoid the mourning and solemnity of our work and times. Everywhere we go union halls have turned into clubhouses for the old and tired waving the bloody shirts of battles long forgotten in a war now seemingly lost. The black cloth draped around and over the local union charter too often is now a symbol of the lost cause, rather than the departed brothers.

Today leaders and organizers of unions rightly shuffle and wiggle with the recognition that our generation, still filled with the lingering passion of great hopes, ideals, and dreams dating to the sixties, presides in less than triumph over the dismantling of the house of labor. We yearn to rebuild labor's mansion to hold vast millions while presiding over Bleak House.

The numbers give us no rest, and there are few now who do not know them well.

- Union membership claims only 13.5% of the U.S. workforce. 120.8 million workers with 16,275,000 million in unions and 104+ million outside.
- Union membership claims only 9.0% of the private sector workforce. In the private sector in 2001 there were close to 102 million employed wage and salary workers: 9.1 million are in our unions and close to 93 million are not.
- In the public sector in 2001 there were 19.2 million employed wage and salary workers: 7.2 million in unions and 11 million are not. Despite this greater density at 37.4%, public employment still only represents a little less than 16% of the total U.S. workforce.
- Despite the primacy of the organizing message NLRB statistics indicate that we have pushed the win rate up to 51.3% of the elections while the number of workers organized averaged 83231 per year over the last decade. Elections per year averaged 3076 down from the average levels of over 5000 per year in the 50's, or over 6000 elections per year in the 60's, or over 7000 elections per year in the 1970's. Where in these years hundreds of thousands of private sector workers were organized under the NLRA, the last 18 years have only seen two instances where more than 100000 in any year found their way into unions through the NLRA maze.
- AFL-CIO organizing statistics, which attempt to capture non-board strategies as well, more than double the yield in the private sector and indicate that in total new organizing the NLRB may represent no more than a quarter of new organizing being posted annually by AFL-CIO affiliates, still discounting large scale affiliations, which rearrange the chairs, but do not represent success in organizing the unorganized.

As leaders and organizers within the Service Employees International Union, we have presided over a period when our union has emerged as the largest in the AFL-CIO and its growth has offered a beacon for many other unionists and for the progressive remnants left in the media and the academy. Nonetheless our world looks better from the inside of the fort looking out, than from the wilderness looking in. Union density in our key jurisdictions (both public and private sector combined) is consistent with the pattern faced elsewhere in the labor movement: 11.2 % in healthcare, 15.5% in hospitals, 10.7% in nursing homes, 19.3% in janitorial, 12.5% in security, and so forth. In the general service sector, which exceeds our jurisdictions, we have only a 2.6% density (all unions combined aggregate in this sector to 5.9% density). We need to recognize that the service sector faces phenomena as dramatic as that faced in the industrial sector. The cataclysmic decline in

manufacturing that has crippled entire industries – and great unions – has also made us witness to an explosion of growth in this sector, which races past our best efforts to organize.

Inside our own union it seems we must recognize that despite our best efforts and rhetoric the limitations in our current program and plan are real and daunting. Certainly by measurements of absolute growth it is hard not to believe that through cleverness, technique, leadership, and plain sweat and toil that we will continue to grow dramatically over the coming years. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether that is enough. Even with full achievement of all of our most wildly ambitious plans and our most optimistic views of the world in which we work, we still face the world with our back against the wall, if for no other reason than that the rest of institutional labor is in tatters. Even building a union with over 10 million members is past much of our imagination, and perhaps past our ability under the methodology of our current practice. This is especially true within the context of the rest of the labor movement, which based on some economic forecasting on a “stock-based” model would have 4-5% density in the private sector workforce by that time. Our size would tower over the rest of the labor movement like Gulliver looking over the Lilliputians.

Achievement of these goals – in whole or in part -- depends on us becoming the best practitioners therefore of minority unionism. All of these goals and plans are premised on our ability to successfully organize and maintain in the nooks, crannies, niches, and secret spaces of the American economy and workforce our pockets of strength and resistance to the dominant tide of union aversion. These are strategies dominated by technique (staff, resources, training, etc.) and tactics – the ability to exploit the margins and maximize the fractures of economic disorganization and inefficiency among the employers to yield high growth and some gains for unionized service workers. Currently minority unionism organizers are guerilla fighters looking for pockets of vulnerability and least resistance, and then often succeeding with finesse to achieve what cannot be managed with power.

What would be involved in addition to our current “minority unionism strategy,” if SEIU, as the largest union in the AFL-CIO, also adopted and advocated a strategy of majority unionism designed at organizing in various formations the great mass of unorganized workers to achieve real power? What would be the appropriate strategies for successfully creating unions – worker associations -- among the other 100 million workers that will be largely unaffected even if we succeed in enrolling another 8.5 million members within our minority union strategy over the next close to 15 years?

Current Affairs and Common Understandings

It is impossible not to recognize the strength of the employer driven campaign on union avoidance and creation of the union free workplace. In 50 years we have gone from 35.7% union density in 1953 at our high water mark to our current 13.5%. The marriage of macro-economic change and determined employer message and policy has combined to confront us at every turn. Our activity (or inactivity in many cases) has been countered at every turn with determination and direction.

The employer strategy has also been ruthless and aided by the complicity of the NLRB. The last generation has seen a rocketing of election based charges and the creation of teeming legions of discriminatees fired in the course of union activity and organizing drives. There is not an organizer alive that does not have to tell an organizing committee – early or late – that two or three of those sitting around her will be fired in the course of the drive. As organizers we have decried the subservience of the NLRB to the employer assault and endlessly documented the erosion of the rights to organize. We have helped assemble the figures on the body count.

None of this has been lost on workers. Surveys indicate that a strong minority (45%) of workers would select a union if they had the opportunity. But, in the face of the earned experience with union membership and union campaigns, and justly placed fear of the employer and the prospect of being fired and hassled, even more workers – in fact more than 75% -- indicate that they would join some kind of worker formation that was not a union, but looked, smelled, and tasted like an organization concentrated on workers issues and interests. Workers are survivors of daily life, and so it does not surprise that a solid majority indicate that they would also prefer an organization that “could work with the employer” in representing them. Maybe the majority of workers have become employer collaborationist, whether we like it or not? Doubtful. Workers want

representation – for sure! And, they indicate that they are ready and willing to fight, but they sure are tired of losing and they sure do want to fight when they have a chance of winning.

Classicists – minority unionists -- are heartened by these statistics – especially those who drink from the half-full glass school of thought – because the number indicates that there is an untapped level of support with a tall ceiling above our current 13%. We can find another third of the workforce ready to enroll, if we can figure out a strategy to capture this part of our market. It may be a minority, but it's so much more than what we have that many may feel we could capture this piece on our minoritarian strategy. Cynical classicists also find support in these figures for employer based strategies which dominate the organizing strategies of many unions and focus on development oriented “labor peace” strategies, political-employer deals around neutrality and organizing rights, bargaining-to-organize tactics, and so forth, because workers clearly are saying in surveys that they will be happy to “accept” a union as their representative if they do not have engage in the struggle themselves with the employer. A majoritarian strategy within these numbers though argues for alternative strategies that hold the promise of mass support, mass participation, and therefore the commitment to build real power.

The collective bargaining regime built by the NLRA and the baby Wagner Acts within many state and local jurisdictions for public workers has also contributed to the rigid structural and strategic box containing and compressing much of current union organizing and bargaining strategies. Significantly, workers have voted in increasing numbers with their feet and joined unions in non-collective bargaining areas, albeit in the public sector, when they have been given the opportunity. Workers through their own actions as well as in surveys indicate repeatedly that their investment in organization is less in bargaining and economics, than it is in pure and simple representation and collective action. This is a real politick that is understandable when only 50% of NLRB elections are won, 50% of those won end up in contracts, and only 50% of the contracts survive more five (5) years. Troubling for existing minority unionization strategies are also the limitations on our ability to win in collective bargaining on some of the bedrock demands of workers – our members – for job security, better healthcare, and living wages. Within the four walls of collective bargaining we are under house arrest, bargaining on the periphery of our organized islands in the oceans of unorganized workers. As union leaders we have to define narrow victories and “best available” settlements premised on progress in the future, which in a silent bond, our members and we realize may never be delivered.

We work in a harsh environment at all levels. In the public sector non-collective bargaining law states now hold 5.2 million of the unorganized public sector workforce or more than half -- 52% -- of the total of the public sector unorganized at all levels. In the private sector (and there is a close overlap) non-union shop states hold 35.8 million of the unorganized private sector workforce or 39.1% of the total of the unorganized private sector. Minoritarian strategies premised on capacity (resources, people, and money) are therefore most difficult and harsh among these workers, yet we often do not significantly alter our models or our expectations despite these stark realities.

Clearly, the strength of minority unionization is frequently therefore more geographical than sectoral. The urban core is the mountain cave still sustaining the fire of classic unionism. Cities – big cities! -- and their metropolitan areas are our last secure redoubts. And, it matters! If density is 23.5% for New York, 16.8% for San Francisco, 18.2% for Chicago, there is strength in these numbers and small sparks can still create good heat. Though rain does not follow the plow, contrary to the dreams of the western pioneers, political power does follow density, and critical mass makes a difference in more than just physics – in organizing it's lifeblood. In organizing the unorganized we need to find the tipping points between minority and majority strategies, but workers know, and we should, that there is a lot to say in organizing for location, location, location. In the South for example one of the only cities showing an increase in union density over the last 10 years is New Orleans, therefore not surprisingly as density now pushes towards 25% in the city (not the SMSA), some things that were not possible 10 or 15 years ago become possible now, even though still difficult. Geographical strength has to be at the heart of a majoritarian strategy.

Mass Base Representation of Individual Workers – The American Workers Association

To erect a workers “tent” large enough to provide cover, support, and action for 100 million workers, one has to be motivated by the old auto mechanic’s slogan: don’t bring 20, bring plenty! The popular models and framework one would create to attract the 75 million workers who have indicated that they would welcome and join such a formation would pattern themselves along the lines of other large, mass membership affinity groups like the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), Common Cause, or a Sierra Club.

These organizations are of course nothing like our minority based unions, where the battles are fought close at hand, but are often long gun, scud firing operations lobbying at distant targets regularly with varying levels of accuracy. But they are not without capacity and effectiveness within our social, economic, and political society as interest groups for seniors, political reformers, and environmentalists respectively.

The AARP founded in 1958 now claims 35 million members, has offices and staff in every state in the country – including 50 staff in California alone – as one example, as well as a host of lawyers, lobbyists, and so forth and arguably the most effective state legislative capacity in the country. Their drug discounts provide a service and an income stream, which would be the envy of any organization.

Common Cause on the other hand was founded in the mid-70’s as a response to the excesses of Watergate and the scandals of campaign financing. Common Cause has always been led by upper middle class patricians and attracts middle class support from the “goo-goo” ranks of good government folks that fueled the Progressive movement in the early years of the 20th century. Modern in another aspect, the membership of 200000 was built strictly through direct mail and one of the most sophisticated mail house, database, and computer operations that one could imagine. Touring their offices a quarter century ago one went through rooms of whirring computers that indeed did presage a future that few organizations have been able to replicate.

Similarly, the Sierra Club utilizing their magazine, direct mail, and high visibility campaigning was able to create both a national and local infrastructure with a professional staff and a semblance of membership democracy that still roils the organization from time to time, but also gives the organization a more vital relationship with its base than one can normally build in the anonymity of direct mail. To have leadership contests and elections among a membership of 700000 speaks to the ability to galvanize the local base on the many levels that prevail in environmental struggle.

It is almost surprising that there is not a mass based, membership organization for individual workers, but of course the AFL-CIO acting occasionally as a representative for many individual workers – unorganized workers -- without requiring them to be members in fact absorbed the social capital necessary to build such an organization in the 20th century. The AFL-CIO came to that role historically more from a sense of New Deal noblesse oblige, than as a natural impulse. Samuel Gompers led the early AFL-CIO to oppose any enactment of labor standards, minimum wages, civil rights, or other social legislation for workers because he believed (as do some labor leaders still!) that any program won for workers through any other agency than a union would retard growth in the union. For Gompers a union was narrowly for its members, and not broadly for workers. This reactive stance to pressure both from the left by the socialist party (and its union supporters) as well as from the Wobblies and from the right by militant employer campaigns has branded the AFL-CIO from his day to our own.

Nonetheless the contemporary growth of an individual worker, membership based organization seems almost inevitable – with or without the support of existing AFL-CIO unions like our own. The reasons are easy to enumerate.

Organizing technology is increasingly accessible, affordable, and, frankly, irresistible. First, the methodology underlining membership recruitment through phone and street canvassing as well as direct mail, though not common among workplace based unions, is well known among community based organizations and easily duplicated. Secondly, the proliferation and acceptance of automatic payment systems through checking accounts via ACH (automated clearing house), credit card payments, and other automatic deductions for utilities and other payments has permeated the working class especially with the explosion of credit card and consumer debt in the last decade, so that non-payroll forms of dues deduction are now practical, inexpensive, and common with utilization decisions now becoming casual and routine. Finally, the increasing ubiquity of computer penetration into middle and working class homes has now accelerated past the earlier rates for either telephones

or television, so that as organizers we are increasingly able to conceive of web-based servicing and networking strategies for worker-members of such a worker association formation. Importantly such servicing techniques also augur for a more financially accessible model and allow more sustainability with a lower potential threshold of membership dues.

In short the mechanics and combustion of such a workers association vehicle are now either virtually or actually in place. Are there other tools available? Certainly the “associate member” program of the AFL-CIO was designed to deliver a “membership benefits package” for individual member workers. We are all familiar with the basic ingredients: the right to apply for a credit card, travel and auto care discounts, life insurance programs, and so forth. Whether this is the right or best combination of ingredients to add value to offset or accelerate dues is unclear, but it is certainly clear that one can put together packages for mass membership organizations. There are also fundamental, big-ticket survival packages that move workers from this base. The ACORN Housing Corporation Loan Counseling program for example closes home purchases for between 6000 – 10000 working families annually. A similar program would work for such an individual worker association base as well. Elements of services being created by area Union Community Funds in addition to the menu of benefits under the Union Privilege Program are all part of this mix.

Is there an accessible program for an American Workers Association? Examples abound. The most well know are certainly the living wage campaigns that have swept the country in recent years leading to the passage of more than 80 ordinances in cities and counties raising the wages of many workers. With the recent passage of a first city-wide increase in the minimum wage in New Orleans (led by SEIU Local 100 and ACORN), more than 50000 workers will get an raise valued at over \$55 million per year. Other cities and coalitions taking this next step could move the wage floor upward through an organized program for hundreds of thousands if not millions of workers. In addition to campaigns there are fertile issues in the entire menu of labor law “protections” for which there is declining enforcement that such an association could now advance. The forums that scream for worker representation at every level of civil and political society offer huge opportunities for an aggressive membership and leadership driven organization of workers to assert standing and seize power at all levels where workers have interests.

Mass Based Representation of Unorganized Sectors

In the same way that one can create a worker formation by recruiting and activating individual workers, so can one also organize workers associations not solely on a general basis, but also on a sectoral or affinity basis.

The outstanding example of such work is the organization of home health care workers over the last twenty years, which has now netted SEIU more than 100000 new members and has been the one area in the health care jurisdiction where we have dramatically increased density with variable strategies to organize the jurisdiction where we had geographically based union density particularly in IL, CA, and NY. A feature of the work in IL and CA has been creating pre-union and pre-bargaining membership based, sectoral advocacy organizations which were able to organize, demonstrate, lobby, coalesce, and fight for status as workers and the right to organize formally within this sector. It is worth remembering about home health organizing that making them quasi-public workers was a deliberate organizing strategy chosen from competing options, not somehow their organizational fate and destiny. In the modern workforce there are increasing “contingent” and other classifications that have been created either by the contemporary economy or through employer artifice and avarice, where there are not easily recognizable or classic definitions of labor-management relationships. Publicly funded home health care was certainly one sector.

Another example would include the burgeoning growth of child care providers, both licensed and unlicensed, which has been partially driven by so-called “welfare reform.” With currently more than 1 million workers in this job category and a predicted job rate growth in the top ten among all classifications there are a lot of overlaps with other service workers. Excluded from NLRA coverage, these workers are classically defined independent contractors: small business operators with 1, 2, 3 or more other employees that are home based, while others are simply contractors housing a couple of kids in their homes. Workers associations created by

either SEIU Local 880 in Chicago, SEIU Local 100 in Little Rock, or ACORN in Los Angeles, Boston, and Oakland are increasingly finding success in organizing these operators.

There is a fair amount of robust, though highly diverse, organizing activity in this area of sectoral and advocacy worker associations: day laborers in many cities are organizing particularly on the East and West Coast; taxi cab operators; workfare recipients; farm workers; high-tech workers in Seattle; small grocery workers in Los Angeles; graduate teaching assistants in many areas; fishermen along the Gulf Coast; and others. Some of these efforts may have the potential of evolving into formalized collective bargaining structures – or may not. Perhaps the best example were the immigrant dry wall workers in Los Angeles who ended up affiliating with the Carpenters and successfully won recognition from home builders in the residential market. The Laborers success in organizing asbestos workers in New York City started from a semi-association, home visitation model. None of this includes the non-bargaining based nurses associations, technologists, social workers, physical therapists and others in the private sector, as well as school bus operators or food service associations throughout the South, or the host of other professional and classification based associations throughout the public sector. Certainly, the efforts to organize clerical workers on an association model have been long standing, vibrant, and led in some situations to classic unionization, although this challenge largely remains to be met in the future as well.

Job classifications that are either excluded from the Act or segregated by the NLRA also lie outside of traditional organizing strategies. One of the largest unorganized job groups is security workers, who cannot be certified under the Act by any union that represents other workers (i.e. any AFL-CIO or multi-jurisdictional independent). Certainly the Service Employees where the confluence of sectoral strength and spatial density combine have made inroads among these workers. An array of independent unions has also organized small numbers of these workers. But with 781900 private sector workers making this one of the fastest growing occupations nationally, this is also an area begging for a majoritarian strategy.

The number of workers directly excluded from coverage is not insignificant, and in many cases reflects not the real status of the workers, but the archaic nature of the law in the modern economy. Low-level supervisors (722800) , managerial employees (12,348,500) , domestic workers (737800) , farm workers (607700) , and of course small shops and other enterprises that fall beneath the minimum tests for interstate commerce (2,000,000) , are all excluded. These job categories now add up to 15,809,100 million workers – over 13% of the total workforce.

Vast numbers of workers are now classified as contingent workers and other workers in “alternative work arrangements” as the Bureau of Labor Statistics calls them, including independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency workers, and contract company workers. Make no mistake, as we all know, these are “moving targets” and as such, they are very, very hard to organize using classic methodologies. The romantic newsmagazine cover story that focuses on home based workers of all stripes, including telecommuters, permatechs, and other classifications hardly imaginable a decade ago, much less more than fifty years ago, misses the forest for these colorful trees. The numbers of these workers are staggeringly large:

Contingent workers	5,400,000 workers	4.0% of total employment
Independent contractors	8,600,000 workers	6.4% of total employment
On-call workers	2,100,000 workers	1.6% of total employment
Temporary help agency wrks	1,200,000 workers	0.9% of total employment
Contract company workers	633000 workers,	0.5% of total employment

Total contingent & alternative workforce 17,933,000 or 13.4% of total workers

Though there has been some organizing of temporary and contingent workers directly from the suppliers, and there is a common NLRB test of coverage for temporary agency workers set at 54 hours per quarter, for the most part these are workers falling out through the net of classic institutional unionization and often that is exactly and precisely part of the point. Decisions by the NLRB in Sturgis and other recent cases that were heralded as opening up avenues for accreting or organizing contract and contingent workers were in practice seen as much more sketchy in application, and are likely to be as temporary as the workforce they describe under the current NLRB alignment. Much organization of service work though in many job classifications has migrated this way, particularly to avoid qualifications and payments of benefits by the direct employer. Nonetheless there is no reason to believe that these are happy campers, and every reason to believe that they would respond to direct organization, though by definition such an association could not be employer based.

Significant groups of private sector professionals in the health care (podiatrists, doctors, interns, chiropractors, anesthesiologists, even LPNs), professional athletes, engineers, lawyers, architects, accountants, programmers, have all built sectoral and job classification formations which either aspire to relationships with employers or have succeeded in some cases in evolving formal stable alignments. Teachers and nurses have led the way in these areas in creating varied organizations on a sectoral basis, which in many cases have evolved to become employer based, membership associations with real power. Some of the professions have evolved along the lines of the building trades by taking control of licensing, certifications, training and apprenticeships, in order to limit entry, control distribution of work, and influence rates of pay (powerfully enough in some cases that combinations have to be regulated to prevent restraint of trade, although actual unions have federal exemptions concerning trade mobility, which is one of our attractions). The question in this area, like so many, is not whether or not creating such formations are possible on a methodological basis or desirable on a participant or constituency basis, but whether or not we choose to move in this direction.

Employer Based Representation Strategies: "Members Only"

One of the most telling indictments of the current minority union strategies being employed by institutional unions is the paucity of activity in large workplaces and among large employers. The great struggle to effectively organize on an industrial rather than a craft model which created the CIO and the modern formation of institutional labor today was rooted in the understanding that mass production was forcing existing labor institutions into minority formations. A craft model could not prevail, because it was not scalable sufficiently in 1937 to organize employers like US Steel (222000 employees), Ford Motor (95000 employees), or world's largest corporation at that time General Motors (250000 employees).

A similar conclusion could be reached today. The number of employers with more than 25000 workers is not small (485) and many of them are in the broadest definition of the service sector. The following is a partial list, which excludes all public employers (and except for places like Texas, Alabama and their corresponding university systems there is good density here or it's a problem already on the list for institutional labor) and even service companies if there is a significant manufacturing component.

Wal-Mart	1244000	ARAMARK	139094
Kelly Services	779100	May Dept Stores	135050
Spherion Corporation	547000	National Amusements	133332
McDonalds	364000	Federated Dept Stores	132400
Sears Roebuck	323000	Wells Fargo & Company	130484
The Kroger Company	312000	Starwood Hotels	129000

J.C. Penney	264555	Publix Super Markets	126000
Target	254000	Pinkertons	124000
Kmart	252000	Electronic Data Systems	122000
Citigroup	242000	Walt Disney	120000
Albertsons	234975	Winn-Dixie Stores	120000
Home Depot	202205	Darden Restaurants	116700
Tricon Global Restaurants	190000	Walgreen Company	116000
HCA, Inc.	167170	Limited	114600
GAP, Inc.	166000	Sodexo, Inc.	111000
PriceWaterhouse	160000	Tenet Healthcare Corp	110642
Bank of America	155906	Johnson Controls	105000
Marriott International	143010	KPMG	100000
Andersen	140000		

These 37 firms have 8,950,213 employees among them. Current union density might statistically be less than 5.0% of the aggregate general workforce in these cumulative categories, though looking at the list one wonders if that number is not too optimistic. The almost 9 million workers on this list is coincidentally almost equal to the current private sector membership of AFL-CIO unions since these firms have about 8.5% of the US workforce. It strains the imagination to believe that political leverage, cleverness, or brilliant savvy in any one union, can overwhelm the sheer bulk of the anti-union determination represented by these major employers.

Not dissimilar to the 1930's the commitment of capacity needed to organize any one of the employers with more than 25000 workers (see full list in Appendix 1) would be huge in terms of money and staff commitments. At a modest \$1000/ per new member any one of these firms with more than 25000 would take \$25,000,000 as a minimal investment, which exceeds the total level of the full organizing budget for all but a handful of unions in the AFL-CIO. At \$1500/per new member, which still probably lowballs the cost significantly, the price tag for any of these non-union companies starts at \$37,500,000, which swamps the total organizing budgets of all but a handful of unions in the federation.

Minority unions are political institutions with mandates to return investments on expenditures of dues and within a classic model of unionization, one would have trouble arguing that these would be appropriate targets for either NLRB based models or that there is leverage sufficient to move them outside of isolated, geographical situations. At the same time if there is no strategy to engage these workers and employers the ability to move these industries does not exist.

The numbers are instructive. Many of these employers have worksites that congregate 500 or more workers under a roof. The number of NLRB elections in such worksites continues to be infinitesimally small and the success rate for unions maintains a pattern over several decades of depressing results. For example in the year 2000 there were 62 elections over 500 workers nationally with unions winning 24 of them for a 38.7% win rate. This result is pretty typical, if not better than usual.

On the other hand large workplaces are the best for “members only” unionization and an employer based strategy. Through direct recruitment and automatic deduction dues procedures, the larger the workplace the greater the proportionate ability to create a critical mass that can sustain an employer based worker association. Experience provides variable results, but workers self-perception of organization seems to find a comfortable threshold around fifty members and increases directly moving upward. Dues revenue also works to offset the cost of recruiting and servicing the membership to achieve sustainability as one drives to majority status. Old organizers used to say that if one can organize ten-percent of the workers, you can represent them all. We know that’s not the truth, now that we are there, but we also know where we have nothing, it’s a good, solid start.

Within the workplace the identical legal “protections” that apply to classic union organizing strategies still prevail. Additionally, many of the “union avoidance” mechanisms installed by employers have created internal “study groups,” grievance procedures, and even “representative” functions in some cases based on worker driven elections of other workers to serve. These internal structures as well as the whole host of labor based social welfare protections that allow agitation and action inside the workplace would be fertile ground for a constant “push and shove” within the workplace.

Since the strategy is to build the strongest possible organization, rather than to proceed to an election or other unreliable tests of group standing, the membership based worker organization also has standing to advocate outside of the workplace around issues relating to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. The current devolution of protections for Enron employees lends new credibility to public standing for internal workplace organizations as credible – and necessary – representatives of unorganized workers. As in so many of these other strategies, workers interests and issues would need to be pushed into the public forum where tests of equity, justice, and fairness are more properly grist for the mill. It is instructive to see the way student based living wage efforts on college campuses have been able to reframe and define the inadequacy of wage structures that institutional unions would have been forced to defend under the normal protocols of collective bargaining rooted in fundamental inequalities of power.

Workplace “members only” organization in the private sector is not hard to understand, and it is hardly novel, since it follows so closely on the classic model of NLRB organizing for example without the strictures. No organizer in an NLRB model ever says they are building a worker committee and worker organization solely to win an election conducted by the Board. We say instead that we are building an organization and an election merely certifies the strength the organization has built in the workplace, just as the contract works to quantify how much power we have built through the workplace organization. In “members only” employer based worker associations, we are in fact aligning our practice more closely with our theory than we are able to do in an election driven, contract determined environment. Liberating the organization from the confines of the vicious election-contract cycle also levels the legal impediments while forcing the employers’ strategy away from the advantages they currently enjoy under the Act.

It is worth remembering some lessons from history as well. Prior to the formalistic legalism that dominates so much of workplace organizational strategy, was an extensive period and practice of “members-only” organization and representation – and workplace actions, including frequent strikes. Way before the dawn of the NLRA one could look at U. S. Steel in Pittsburgh in 1909 when they had 118000 workers of whom 8000 belonged to a union (or 6.8% density) or in 1913 the tire companies Firestone, Goodyear, and Goodrich had 197000 workers combined with 14000 union members (7.1% density). The unions, following the model prevalent at the time were largely craft based even in an industrial setting. Nonetheless the success of these earlier organizers of that era was no different than what we are experiencing today as captured by comparable density figures.

Similarly on the eve of the great CIO drives both in auto and steel the base was constructed through meticulous community organization. The UAW had almost 500 organizers at work prior to the first sit-down strike in Flint enrolling individual members and stitching them together through a network of community soup kitchens (some 400) and baseball teams (some 500) and a membership going into the strikes of between 30-40000 in the area. The Steelworkers Organizing Committee (SWOC) moved over 600 organizers on the eve of their first agreement on similar strategies. Just as we would argue is appropriate today, organizers then first built an

organization – a union, if you will – and then seized the opportunity to leverage their leadership and organization into the critical position where they could “represent” the entire workforce.

Contemporary examples of “members-only” organizations are more prevalent in the public sector, where many unions, including SEIU, AFT, CWA, AFSCME, and a host of independents, most prominent among them, the NEA – the National Education Association -- have built organization in many states where public workers lack bargaining rights. In some cases over time such formations are convertible into formalized consultation or bargaining rights depending on the “push and shove” of the organization or the confluence of worker and political power where there are not other legal barriers. In the private sector the conversion of the American Nurses Association (ANA), which existed for years as a committed professional association, then made the transition to a mixed form organization with some professional characteristics and some collective bargaining relationships, and more recently has calved out more than 100000 members in selected venues as an AFL-CIO affiliated union, is a good example of what might be a replicable model over time in a new form of membership based, rather than bargaining based, union building. The ANA mixed form model is certainly not substantially different than the situation within NEA, where a majority of the members in this 2 million member labor organization, are in “members only” non-bargaining relationships and where the chapter (“local”) size is also relatively small with the largest chapters no more than 5000 members and hundreds of chapters less than 1000 members.

Clearly such work involves different organizing protocols than are common in much of current “minority” unionization models, many of which would be more analogous to what one observes in many community based organizations. The collective bargaining regime has its own ebb and flow, and would have to be eschewed for a clarity that relied on a membership driven program, rather than one that is contract driven, which would rely on “shop” floor activity, a heavy diet of issues, campaigns, and grievance handling which engages a wide array of the impacted workers and moves them to action and recruitment. The organizer’s role would also be different in such a model. Not harder, not easier, but certainly different.

Geographically Based Representation Strategies

Labor’s heartland is the urban core of American cities. The synergy of density in cities should inform all the particular strategies advanced earlier. Utilizing organizing councils for multi-union projects seemed a promising way to maximize capacity and minimize institutional risk. Urban central labor federations offered logical advantages for both multi-jurisdictional work as well as the prospects for priming organizational activity in unorganized sectors by utilizing existing union strengths. The signal advantage of strong CLC’s were political. The ability to leverage the entire labor movement to create political advantage and opportunity for organizational success was especially located in CLC’s. The early promotion of Union Cities by the Sweeney Administration in the AFL-CIO and the Los Angeles AFL-CIO Convention initiatives for a “new alliance” program to resource the CLC’s so that they had sufficient capacity to have 2-3 staff people per CLC and the ability to initiate and drive programs for affiliates was all very promising, as were the notions promoted by within the AFL-CIO Organizing Department to pursue geographical organizing.

Despite the value of the strategic theory, the record has been underwhelming. Union Cities has devolved into a computer distribution and reward ceremony. Full affiliation is no closer today than it has been over the last several decades since the Kirkland Changing Situation of Work report. The CLC’s have not been resourced and consolidated for the most part and there is little political energy or will to do so, and fewer financial resources to entice the results. The primary AFL-CIO “geo-projects” in Seattle and Stamford, Connecticut have not survived in these forms. Seattle has been subsumed into the CLC, while Stamford survives as a multi-union project supported by individual beneficiary and client unions (including SEIU). The Los Angeles County AFL-CIO’s leadership in hiring an organizing director to assist affiliates moving into organizing programs was largely abandoned in 2001, when the organizing director was not replaced. The main energy of CLC’s has largely been focused on the political program of the federation or individual affiliates, rather than the organizing program. It is unclear whether at this increasingly late date the momentum towards welding the politics to organizing in can be achieved.

Regardless of the arguable merits of the strategy or the fairness of the experiments to put it in practice, the other irreconcilable dilemma lies in the disproportionate strength of building trades affiliates in many urban CLC's which continues to prevent "one program, one voice" strategies. Many CLC's are in transition so the "trades versus other affiliate" struggles continue to be fought city by city around the country, but particularly as long as there is less than full affiliation, the trades to their credit are able to leverage their predominately urban based strength and relatively high dues rates to hold the goals and objectives of the entire labor movement captive in many cities, either through effective utilization of their own Building Trades Council which competes politically with the CLC and not infrequently is the tail wagging the CLC dog. The trades at best have only 7.8% of the total membership of the labor movement, but the lack of full affiliation and their relatively higher appreciation of the advantage of local politics in their job creation and other strategies subsume many other institutional and organizational goals for labor in the public sphere.

There are at least four ways this can be changed. First, affiliate all of our own members fully. Secondly, combine with other public and service worker unions and create a Service Worker Council as a countervailing voice and political arm analogous to what exists in the trades. Thirdly, advocate within the AFL-CIO for a full affiliation policy on a more rapid timeline. And, finally, advocate within the AFL-CIO and within the CLC's for governance structures that are weighted to per capita strength not history, tradition, or participation.

Like them or not, they matter. They matter in areas where labor is weak, because they are often the classic expression of the "strength of weak ties" and the only voice for labor in many jurisdictions and cities where we are less than dominant. If we are going to move politicians and the public forum around our issues, agenda, and aspirations we have to consolidate the agenda of local labor movements.

The other side of geography, past density and coordinated jurisdictional aspirations, that is both irresistible and perilous to ignore, lies in the problem of hegemony. It is a problem we face in only a few situations currently, but unless there are changes elsewhere in the institutional labor, it is a problem that could exacerbate. What would happen if in community after community, SEIU were the only union with an organizing program? The only magnet in the field attracts all the iron. If any union, SEIU or another, becomes dominant – or perhaps even significant – in a spatial area, then trying to achieve increased market share among any unorganized workers regardless of classic jurisdictional patterns is seductive. Certainly the UAW's strategy in Michigan has been "geographic" for decades and has led them to any thing along a road, rather to anything having to do with an automobile. Currently, this seems increasingly the strategy of the Steelworkers in the South particularly where they are focusing on geographic markets where for various reasons they believe the reputation of the Steelworkers is significant and would be a clarion to unorganized workers. USW efforts to organize city workers in Birmingham, Alabama and Corpus Christi, Texas are certainly good examples of such geo-strategies. The AFL-CIO has been on a campaign to push unions to focus on "core" industries, but in geographies where particular unions dominate, a geo-strategy is seductive. In coming years similar problems are going to propel this issue within SEIU locals in a number of geographies where, either by design or default, we might end up with the only organizing program. A version of this problem already faces us as we examine our role within the federation.

Role of Community Based Organizations

We also have to broaden, rather than narrow the agenda consistent with a majoritarian strategy, rather than the minority stakeholder strategy currently being pursued by most local labor federations. Paul Osterman, Tom Kochan and others have recently argued that in an era of declining union density many of the traditional roles of labor unions in representing unorganized workers have been taken over by community based organizations like ACORN, the Industrial Areas Foundation, and other community based coalitions. They call this "extended unionism." A similar theory was advanced by Ken Johnson, AFL-CIO Southern Regional Director, who argues that the strength of the current organizing opportunity in the South lies in the majority density achieved through the alliance of labor and community based organizations in many southern cities – once again at least a majoritarian strategy.

Whether true or hyperbolic, there is no question that mass based community organizations offer opportunities to develop and drive majoritarian strategies for workers. Once again the Living Wage Movement in various cities

and counties throughout the country largely led by community, labor, and religious coalitions has been instructive. The next generation of such struggles can be seen in the both wage district achieved in Santa Monica and the citywide minimum wage increase won at the ballot in New Orleans, which offer the opportunity for uniting workers, particularly service workers, behind a banner of community-unionism that offers rich rewards.

In a recent letter by Newt Gingrich sent to major national business executives convening a meeting on business response to the “living wage” movement, he claimed that “... every 14 days a living wage measure is being passed somewhere in the country.” He fretted that business interests find living wage ordinances to be severe constraints on unfettered abilities to move markets on wages, particularly at a time when they believe that they can make reasonably assured predictions in many of the same markets that institutional labor will for the most part not move the overall labor wage market. Many of these efforts were modest in direct worker impact though this seems to be changing, and unions increasingly need to make clearer decisions about where they want to be positioned in an escalating fight that has deep worker and citizen support. The workers affected are increasingly significant. The San Francisco ordinance impacted 20000+. The measure proposed currently in New York City by a coalition of community based organizations and unions would raise wages on 200000 workers. The measure in Los Angeles several years ago involved 10000 workers. The citywide ordinance passed in New Orleans received over 70000 votes in favor to raise the wages on more than 50000 exclusively private sector workers at a price tag proponents indicated would hit \$55 million paid by private firms in the city. Similar citywide ordinance initiatives are being debated and planned in San Antonio, St. Petersburg, San Francisco, Baton Rouge, and Shreveport among other cities.

The role of “community unionism” is also an area where disciplined and committed work continues to yield interesting – and promising – results. In some areas these prototype organizations are among the few forces designing the formation of a new unionism in hardscrabble ground for traditional minority unionization strategies. The Texas UFW which under Juanita Valdez Cox over the last twenty years has built a membership of between 5000-8000 in the Rio Grande Valley on a service and advocacy model around wide ranging community issues in the colonias and worker based issues in public and private areas has platformed a strategy which they are designing to begin replicating in San Antonio currently. CAFÉ (Carolina Action for Full Employment) has been another – 1000 plus member – organization that for many years has been one of the few active voices for unorganized workers in South Carolina. The Philadelphia Unemployment Project for almost 30 years has been a primary advocate for widespread unorganized workers in that community. The Workers and Tenants Committee in Arlington, Virginia has built an interesting organization in recent years using living wages, hotel unionization, and now home day care, along with housing and tenants issues. There are a number of projects supported by either ACORN or the Industrial Areas Foundation, which have also forged these kinds of models.

Unquestionably, deeply rooted community based organizations and coalitions have proven over recent years in this building effort that they can lead workers in a majoritarian strategy and produce results that set the stage for even larger victories.

No Silver Bullets: The Limits of Leverage

We already knew that being smart does not make us rich, but we also must recognize that being clever also does not mean we will win.

We have seen extensive breakthroughs in organizing over the last 20-30 years. Organizers are no longer the stepchildren of the labor family. We have pioneered in various areas, both strategic and tactical, using combinations of leverage, both economic (using investments, pension assets, shareholder strategies, board seats, stock positions) and political, to a finely honed level that has allowed us to organize tens of thousands, especially where we are able to neutralize the employer or take the employer out of the campaign. Our “justice for janitors” campaign has been masterful and the best of what we have to offer.

Corporate campaigns and strategies have reached a level of sophistication over the last quarter of a century that was virtually unimaginable within labor struggles of the past. Coupled with workers in motion such tactics have allowed us to beat individual firms even in the midst of our implosion of impotence.

But, there are limits to the effectiveness of any repetitive tactic as targets adapt and adjust, and in some cases no amount of infrastructure and artifice can conceal the fact that we have neither organized the workers, nor can we prove their support in normal ways. Furthermore externally oriented strategies walk careful balances around uncontrollable events. For example when there is decreased hospitality investment in a recession, then no amount of labor peace agreements will add members that are dependent on economic expansion in spatial markets. Even control of spatial markets becomes diluted, if concerns for safety lead to relocation of office markets away from urban central business districts, as another example. The best back room deal and top down maneuver cannot finally put enough workers in motion in enough places to create a majoritarian alignment of power for working families.

Everything That Moves: The Artificiality of Jurisdiction

No matter how large SEIU becomes in absolute terms within institutional labor, it is hard to imagine that we can thrive indefinitely as an island in an unorganized ocean. Today, as the largest union in the federation, almost 1 of every 10 AFL-CIO members is a member of the Service Employees. Even in the dream and mirage of our most optimistic growth goals, which would increase our numbers almost tenfold over the next 15 years, there is no illusion that allows one to argue that we will continue to be only 10% of institutional labor. The likelihood within the current trajectory of practice and program is that were we to perform this miracle we would more likely be 1 of every 2 members (remember the high water of membership was only 21 million in 1979) or, let's dream 1 of every 3 members (which would put the total membership then at 30 million with SEIU at 10 million and density of perhaps 20% of total employment. Is this going to happen? Doubtful.

We really do not have the choice of simply polishing our pearl, while the rest of the working population goes under in the high waves of anti-union animus. The dominance within the general service sector of companies able to tout their huge workforces that are virtually 100% non-union, brands a cultural message across the foreheads of workers that is inescapable and relentless. The list in Appendix 1 is exhausting and depressing. The modern success stories of the American service economy are almost all non-union.

In order to construct a majoritarian strategy from the existing minority unionism practice, one would have to believe that there is sufficient organizational will and capacity to organize giant workforces in banking, finance, and insurance for example, where the chartered affiliates are infinitesimally small. The computer industry has already moved almost all manufacturing offshore, and there is really no union in the federation that could honestly call itself the "computer workers" union. Retail establishments, department stores, and general commercial establishments are staggering in size and scale, and national in range and distribution. In fact of the largest dozen service sector companies, two-thirds (8/12) of the largest with 3,086,735 workers would arguably be in the jurisdiction of one single AFL-CIO affiliate, the UFCW. Of these one could aver that the UFCW is engaged in organizing and representing workers in both Krogers and Alberstons. But that's really it, and fairly stated, how could anyone expect that any one union would have the capacity to resolve this organizing problem in the teeming growth of the service sector. What really is the rational response within the labor movement when a union files a single petition before the NLRB to represent a unit of 100 or 200 workers at Wal-Mart?

There is really no finger to point. Six of the dozen largest service sector companies are thirty or less years old, so their explosive growth paralleled the period of labor decline. It is axiomatic that an institution in decline is going to have fewer resources and less energy to grow, than is one that is expanding with some certainty and success. Equally in periods of retraction, methodology becomes more staid, conservative, and uncertain particularly within political institutions, rather than eager to embrace change and innovation. There was no practice or tradition within institutional labor that would have been able to conclude at the time that a particular firm or method of physically organizing work and commerce (as one found in the K-Mart's, Wal-Mart's, Targets, and Home Depots, or for that matter in the McDonald's fast food configurations that revolutionized the restaurant industry or the franchising of travel that allowed for the explosion of the tourism and hospitality industries) was such a threat to the entire body of American workers and their long term financial security that it had to be met in new and different ways with new and different resources and commitments. Yet these were precisely the kinds of challenges faced earlier when mass production, and the firms that mastered such methods, revolutionized the organization of work.

Jurisdiction has become a classic example of a “default” choice – hardly more than an excuse for not recognizing and moving on immense problems faced by workers – a set of blinders obscuring reality. As an organizing principle, it does not move new work, and failure to hold density does not lead to reorganization of the institutional task or absorption or assumption of the task by other actors within the existing framework. Jurisdiction also does not translate into an exclusivity of representation, so most of the weight it carries seems to be historical and traditional, except when it is market based and geographically rooted.

The lack of organization and representation carries iron law consequences. The paucity of wages and benefits among so many of these “associates” in the mega-firms bleeds over to all areas of service sector work and arguably, as the service sector continues to grow in dominance, impoverishes all American workers. The lack of protections also generates transience, turnover, contingency, and “downskilling” of millions of jobs.

No union has the resources to tackle some of these firms in the classic sense, which calls for some union, or unions, to advocate and implement new organizing models to engage these firms and represent workers in these areas.

Moving Forward

There is every indication that the federated structure is an extremely poor vehicle to address the dilemma of building a majoritarian labor movement. The AFL-CIO is a system of voice streaming and service delivery for its existing members and affiliates only able to muster larger consensus and mutuality around political goals and objectives. This is all exceedingly valuable and certainly functioned well enough in bad times and good to allow us to survive even as we have steadily atrophied for almost 50 years.

Reading the papers over recent months has been instructive in understanding the structure and functionality of institutional labor. The more one reads about the complex situation in Afghanistan mired in tribal, almost medieval, decentralization and dysfunction – except within the narrow band of its own jurisdiction – the more one came to understand the house of labor as well and our own tribalism. Intricate codes, ancient traditions, and an abiding sense that the house may be on fire, but if the room where you sit is cool, then there is really no fundamental problem. All of this was eerily familiar. Furthermore being a bigger tribe, a richer tribe, a more powerful tribe did not mean an end to treachery or that others would swear fealty and ask for protection, as much as it simply mean that others might be more obsequious. We could be masters of our universe leading our own parade, as long as we did not expect others to move with us. Politics certainly became the common ground upon which all tribes, no matter how different or contentious, could travel, since we could operate at the very lowest common denominator in politics – pro-labor or anti-labor, with us or against us – and still continue to each listen to the sound of a different drum, while fiddling as our house burned to the ground.

Despite this on-going crisis, one could not simply state an overarching vision for a united organizing strategy for all of labor. We have truly created a federation that is smaller than its individual parts – by design and now by habit. What could the strategy be? Virtually anything would be an improvement. Reconfigure to organize the nation’s largest employers? Consolidate all union capacity in the largest 50 metropolitan areas in the country and achieve 50% density? Concentrate all organizing resources on the demographic groups that indicate more than a majority of support for unionization? Whatever? It’s not going to happen, so it’s hard to think about very seriously.

American workers need organizations that allow their participation without permission of their bosses! Such a simple truth, yet one that frequently escapes us. American workers want organizations that will advocate for their broad interests. There is every indication that they would join, participate, and fight for their interests in such organizations. We have to advocate and advance a program that builds real power for all workers, not just some power for a small sum of workers in a segment of the workplaces.

I argue here that there are three kinds of organizations that should be created to build a new labor movement. At the broadest level there needs to be an American Workers Association which enlists millions of individual workers as members and gives them voice across the broad range of issues – wages, health, pensions, safety, training – that workers feel and where they currently find no home, as well as issues which speak to the vision

of amalgamated workers for justice, equity, freedom, and full citizenship in the fullest of its aspiration and meaning. At a more specialized level workers need to form sectoral associations which more particularly focus on their issues within job classifications, professions, and sectors and create and advocate a vision of organization and entitlements that give voice to public demands and private needs. There needs to be serious work in the trenches with larger employers to create “members only” representation at workplaces large enough to sustain ongoing organization and engage in continuous site by site struggles around identifiable issues, campaigns, and victories which redefine the historic meaning of union for workers at their jobs and allow us to re-engineer institutional labor and its relationship with workers, members, the law, and the iron lung of contracts and current bargaining. Finally, these initiatives need to create a powerful and dynamic synergy that welds together the alliance of urban workers and urban community organizations that is reshaping the progressive vision and experience throughout contemporary America. Tying these pieces together tightly will produce strategies that seek to organize and unite workers on a majoritarian basis and therefore allow us once again to shape our future with strength.

Recently when Cecil Roberts, the President of the United Mine Workers, met with the SEIU International Executive Board in Miami, he issued a challenge for SEIU to be the “mineworkers of the modern labor movement” and play the role he wanted to argue had been the historic role of the UMW in creating the CIO. It’s important to remember that while the UMW in fact did help seed the widespread organizing among industrial workers in a new non-craft orientation, they also took advantage of the upsurge in worker confidence in unions, organizing, and the new tactics to build and expand their own union at the first ranks of the new unionism of that time. Answering the call for our time to create a new paradigm to organize a majority of the unorganized – come hell or high water, one way or another – is not to abandon the project of building SEIU, but it is to embrace the reality that no matter how strong we build SEIU, we can not survive alone or for long in a dying labor movement. We need to embrace the mandate to help create a real labor movement, if not because of simple conviction and basic principle, because of our own institutional self-interest and recognition that in times of movement, our own unions will also amplify and expand.

Stay the course, but also help find the new road so that many millions more can come with us – now, and not in the sweet by and by.

Wal-Mart	1244000	Salvation Army	45182
Kelly Services	779100	Mayo Clinic	44200
Spherion Corporation	547000	Catholic Healthcare West	44000
McDonalds	364000	Dollar General	44000
Sears Roebuck	323000	Cardinal Health	43700
The Kroger Company	312000	Radioshack	43600
J.C. Penney	264555	Sun Microsystems	43300
Target	254000	Cigna Corporation	43200
Kmart	252000	Auto Zone	43000
Citigroup	242000	Mariner Post-Acute Net	43000

Albertsons	234975	Sun Healthcare Group	42240
Home Depot	202205	Extendicare	41100
Tricon Global Restaurants	190000	Automatic Data Processng	41000
HCA, Inc.	167170	Wendy's International	41000
GAP, Inc.	166000	Aetna	40700
PriceWaterhouse	160000	Sysco	40585
Bank of America	155906	Harrahs	40190
Marriott International	143010	Service Corp	40016
Andersen	140000	One Source	40000
ARAMARK	139094	Nordstrom	40000
May Department Stores	135040	H&R Block	40000
National Amusements	133332	Marmon Holdings	40000
Federated Dept Stores	132400	Jack-in-the-Box	40000
Wells Fargo & Company	130484	Dell Computer	40000
Starwood Hotels	129000	Texas Instruments	39771
Publix Super Markets	126000	Microsoft	39191
Pinkertons	124000	Crawford Group	38722
Electronic Data Systems	122000	Bain Capital	38000
Walt Disney	120000	Green Equity Investors	37800
Winn-Dixie Stores	120000	Triad Hospitals	37500
Darden Restaurants	116700	Liberty Mutual Fire	37000
Walgreen Co	116000	Hyatt Equities	36760
Limited	114600	Clear Channel Comm	36700
Sodexo, Inc.	111000	Arvin Meritor	35830
Tenet Healthcare Corp	110642	Cke Restaurants	35500
Johnson Controls	105000	Ames Department Stores	35300

KPMG	100000	Adventist Health System	35000
Six Continent Hotels	90000	Universal Corporation	35000
Kaiser Fnd Health Plan	90000	Regis Corporation	35000
American Express	90000	Sutter Health	35000
Bank One Corp	80778	OfficeMax	35000
Supevalu Inc	80000	Bon Secours Health Syst	34512
Laidlaw, Inc.	80000	Cisco Systems	34045
State Farm Mutual Auto	78643	Montgomery Ward	34000
Costco Wholesale Corp	78000	Freeman Decorating	34000
Hilton Hotels	77000	Carnival Corporation	33400
Rite Aid Corporation	75500	7-Eleven	33400
Best Buy Co	75000	Genuine Parts	33000
Integrated Health Services	73200	Michaels Stores	33000
Dillards	72000	Advantica Restaurant	32700
Merrill Lynch & Co	72000	American Red Cross	32500
Wachovia Corp	71262	Time-Warner	32000
Compass Group	70000	Family Dollar	31200
Toys R Us, Inc	69000	Autonation	31000
Solectron Corp	68273	Deloitte & Touche	30000
Brinker International	68000	Ernst & Young	30000
Big Lots Inc	65000	Shopko Stores	30000
Wackenhut Corp	64300	Borders Group	30000
Beverly Enterprises	64000	Wyndham International	30000
Labor Ready	63250	United Health Group	30000
Prudential Financial	60000	Professional Staff Lsg	30000
Schlumberger	60000	Res-Care, Inc.	30000

FleetBoston Financial	60000	Trinity Health	30000
ABM Industries	59835	Wegmans Food Mrkts	29012
Park Place Entertainment	59200	Life Care Centers	29000
Circuit City Stores	59194	National Mutual Ins	28550
Pharmacia Corp	59000	Burger King Corp	28000
H. E. Butt Grocery	57000	Suntrust Banks	28000
Waste Management	57000	Autoliv	28000
Marsh & McLennan	57000	Allied Waste	28000
Omnicom Group	56000	Pathmark Stores	27823
Saks Inc	55000	Meristar Hotels	27500
Manor Care	54000	First Data Corp	27440
Staples	53561	U S Bancorp	26891
Healthsouth	53458	Fresenius Med Care	26732
Allstate Corp	52921	Mellon Financial	26640
Personnel Group of Am	51350	Hartford Financial	26600
Grand Metropolitan	50000	Washington Mutual	26450
Kindred Healthcare	49800	Charles Schwab	26300
Ladbroke Hotels	49693	Royal Caribbean Cruises	26200
Outback Steakhouse	49000	Dollar Tree Stores	26200
Ascension Health	48000	Computer Associates	26126
Office Depot	48000	Universal Health Services	25600
Barnes & Noble	48000	PNC Financial	25300
Starbucks	47000	Menard	25180
Metlife	46700	News America Mktg	25000
Genesis Health Ventures	46000	Kaiser Foundation Hspt	25000

Source: UNICORE Database

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Which is not to say that any of them agree with these conclusions or stand anywhere near me when it comes to taking responsibility for the inevitable errors that may have crept in or the outlandish conclusions that then followed. That weight I bear alone.

Appendix 1

US Service Based Private Sector Employers with Over 25000 Employers